Criminal Law—Excluding Evidence of Prior Crimes When Trial Resulted in Acquittal—State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979) by unknown
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 6
1980
Criminal Law—Excluding Evidence of Prior
Crimes When Trial Resulted in Acquittal—State v.
Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979)
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
(1980) "Criminal Law—Excluding Evidence of Prior Crimes When Trial Resulted in Acquittal—State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307
(Minn. 1979)," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 6: Iss. 2, Article 6.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss2/6
CASE NOTES
Criminal Law-EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES WHEN TRIAL
RESULTED IN ACQUITrAL--Sate . Wakefld, 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn.
1979).
"In a very real sense a defendant starts his life afresh when he stands
before a jury, a prisoner at the bar."
Mr. ChiefJudge Cardozo, for the court,
in Peoplev. Zackowt'tz, 254 N.Y. 192, 197,
172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930).
At common law, evidence of an accused's prior criminal conduct was
excluded from trial.I Because of the potential probative value of prior
criminal conduct evidence, several exceptions to the general exclusionary
rule developed. 2 Although courts have often applied a number of proce-
dural safeguards to protect defendants from the possible prejudicial ef-
fect of such evidence, 3 the exceptions have been broadly construed.4 In
fact, courts seldom have differentiated between two types of prior con-
duct that appear intrinsically dissimilar-prior acquittal evidence and
prior conviction evidence 5 -when determining the admissibility of evi-
dence of prior conduct. In State v. Wakefield,6 the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized this important distinction and ruled that prior acquit-
tal evidence is inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial.7
In Wakefield, defendant was convicted of first degree criminal sexual
conduct.8 At trial, one of the witnesses for the state was a victim of an
alleged earlier rape.9 The supreme court ruled that admitting this testi-
mony was reversible error because defendant had been acquitted of that
crime."10 The court held that "under no circumstances is evidence of a
crime other than that for which a defendant is on trial admissible when
the defendant has been acquitted of that other offense."z1
1. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 192, 194 (3d ed. 1940).
2. The leading case is People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901), which
established the major exceptions: to show motive; to show intent; to negative mistake; to
show a common plan or scheme; and to establish identity. Id. at 293, 61 N.E. at 294.
Minnesota recognized these exceptions in State v. Fitchette, 88 Minn. 145, 148, 92 N.W.
527, 528 (1902). In State v. Schueller, 120 Minn. 26, 29, 138 N.W. 937, 938 (1912), these
exceptions were applied specifically to sex crimes. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b)-(c) has codified
these exceptions.
3. See notes 32-40 infia and accompanying text.
4. See United States v. Deaton, 381 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Because the ex-
ceptions are so numerous, it is difficult to determine whether the doctrine or the acknowl-
edged exceptions are the more extensive.").
5. See notes 14-15 i-fra and accompanying text.
6. 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979).
7. See id. at 308-09.
8. Id. at 307.
9. Id. at 308.
10. See id. at 307.
11. Id. at 309,
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The Minnesota court's holding in Wakefield adopts the minority posi-
tion regarding the admission of prior acquittal evidence.12 The general
rule is that prior acquittal evidence may be admitted if it falls within an
exception to the exclusionary rule.13 Most jurisdictions make no distinc-
tions between cases in which the defendant was convicted and those in
which the defendant was acquitted,1 4 or even released after arrest, 15
when determining the admissibility of the evidence. These jurisdictions,
however, do require prior criminal conduct evidence to satisfy a certain
standard of proof. 16 If this threshold degree of proof is met, the court
must independently determine whether the prejudicial impact17 of the
evidence is outweighed by its probative value.18 If this test is not met,
12. See id. at 309. Other jurisdictions have held evidence of a crime for which the
defendant was previously acquitted to be inadmissible. See, e.g., Wingate v. Wainwright,
464 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 307, 350 P.2d 756, 764
(1960); State v. Perkins, 349 So. 2d 161, 163-64 (Fla. 1977); People v. Ulrich, 30 Ill. 2d 94,
101, 195 N.E.2d 180, 183-84 (1963); Asher v. Commonwealth, 324 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Ky.
1959); Ladnier v. State, 254 Miss. 469, 475, 182 So. 2d 389, 391-92 (1966); State v. Kerwin,
133 Vt. 391, 395, 340 A.2d 45, 47-48 (1975); cf State v. Tindal, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 488, 490
(1854) (weight of evidence destroyed if defendant proves previous trial resulted in acquit-
tal).
13. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 40 Ala. App. 101, 104, 108 So. 2d 188, 191 (1959);
People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507, 515 (1865); Bell v. State, 57 Md. 108, 118-19 (1881); People
v. Johnston, 328 Mich. 213, 227, 43 N.W.2d 334, 340 (1950); State v. Millard, 242 S.W.
923, 926 (Mo. 1922); Koenigstein v. State, 101 Neb. 229, 238, 162 N.W. 879, 882 (1917);
State v. Heaton, 56 N.D. 357, 369-70, 217 N.W. 531, 536 (1927).
14. See, e.g., Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960, 968 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928
(1978); Dandridge v. State, 109 Ga. App. 33, 33-34, 134 S.E.2d 814, 815 (1964); State v.
Darling, 197 Kan. 471, 479-80, 419 P.2d 836, 844 (1966); State v. Schlue, 129 N.J. Super.
351, 355-56, 323 A.2d 549, 552 (App. Div. 1974).
15. See, e.g., People v. Fox, 126 Cal. App. 2d 560, 569, 272 P.2d 832, 838 (1954)
(testimony of prior arrest admissible to show common plan or design despite release after
dismissal of charge).
16. The standard of proof necessary varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Compare,
e.g., People v. McClellan, 71 Cal. 2d 793,806, 457 P.2d 871, 879-80, 80 Cal. Rptr. 31, 39-
40 (1969) (accomplice's testimony of prior crimes must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt before it is admissible at penalty trial) with, e.g., Tucker v. State, 82 Nev. 127, 131,
412 P.2d 970, 972 (1966) (plain, clear, and convincing evidence that accused committed
prior offense necessary before evidence of prior offense can be admitted at trial).
17. According to Professor Wigmore:
The reasons [for prejudice] thus marshalled in various forms are reducible
to three: (1) The over-strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the
charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts; (2) The tendency to
condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the present charge, but because he
has escaped unpunished from other offenses; . . . (3) The injustice of attacking
one necessarily unprepared to demonstrate that the attacking evidence is
fabricated . ...
1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 194.
18. The Minnesota rule provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." MINN. R. EvID. 403.
[Vol. 6
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss2/6
CASE NOTES
the evidence is inadmissible. 19 Since evidence of either proven or alleged
prior criminal conduct often has substantial probative value,20 the evi-
dence generally is admitted.2 1 The Alabama Court of Appeals in Robin-
son v. State22 expressed the majority view: "[W]e are clearly of [the]
opinion the general rule is that the fact that a defendant in a criminal
prosecution has been acquitted of another offense does not render evi-
dence of such prior offense inadmissible, if such evidence is otherwise
competent."
2 3
The Wakefield decision makes the use of the majority rule's balancing
test unnecessary when evidence of a prior acquittal is involved. Wake-
f/ld's adoption of the minority rule establishes an absolute bar to the use
of such evidence in Minnesota.2 4 Therefore, no case-by-case judicial
evaluation is necessary. Other courts that follow the minority position
have placed emphasis upon collateral estoppel,25 general unfairness,26
and jury prejudice2 7 as the foundation for their decisions. The Wakefeld
court's basic rationale, however, was that introduction of evidence of a
prior acquittal contravened a fundamental principle of our system ofjus-
tice-that the state be allowed to try and convict the accused only
once.28 The court stated:
[Ilt is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence that once the state has mus-
tered its evidence against a defendant and failed, the matter is done. In
the eyes of the law the acquitted defendant is to be treated as innocent
and in the interests of fairness and finality made no more to answer for
his alleged crime.
2 9
Although this language seems to resemble that used in discussions of col-
lateral estoppel and double jeopardy, 30 the Minnesota court did not rely
19. See, e.g., People v. Corbeil, 77 Mich. App. 691, 696, 259 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1977)
(per curiam) (evidence inadmissible if probative value outweighed by prejudicial impact);
Nester v. State, 75 Nev. 41, 54, 334 P.2d 524, 531 (1959) (prejudicial evidence inadmissible
even though otherwise relevant).
20. See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 194 ("[Prior criminal conduct evidence] is ob-
jectionable, not because it has no appreciative probative value, but because it has too
much.'.
21. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 40 Ala. App. 101, 104, 108 So. 2d 188, 191 (1959). But
see State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d at 309.
22. 40 Ala. App. 101, 108 So. 2d 188 (1959).
23. Id. at 104, 108 So. 2d at 191.
24. See State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d at 309.
25. See, e.g., Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1972).
26. See, e.g., State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 307, 350 P.2d 756, 764 (1960) (verdict of
acquittal should relieve defendant from again having to answer evidence of prior crime).
27. See, e.g., State v. Kerwin, 133 Vt. 391, 395, 340 A.2d 45, 48 (1975).
28. See 278 N.W.2d at 308.
29. Id.
30. Under a double jeopardy analysis, the accused cannot be put on trial twice for the
same crime. When evidence of a prior acquittal for a different crime is used, however, the
defendant is not being tried for the the previous offense. Previous conduct is only being
used as evidence to gain a conviction for the present charge. But cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397
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upon either of these principles in reaching its decision. The court's ap-
proach was made necessary by the fact that neither the principle of col-
lateral estoppel nor those of double jeopardy. were applicable to the facts
in Wakefeld. 3 1
The Minnesota court often has expressed concern over the use of prior
criminal conduct evidence because of the accompanying negative aspects
of such evidence.32 The court has not limited itself to precautionary
rhetoric but has developed procedural safeguards to lessen the prejudi-
cial impact of prior criminal conduct evidence. In State v. Sreigl,33 the
court held that the prosecution must, within a reasonable time before
trial, give the defendant a written statement of the offenses that it intends
to show were committed. 34 The purpose of this notice requirement is to
insure that the defendant has the opportunity to prepare a defense to the
evidence.35
Spre'gl was followed by the development of further safeguards against
the potential misuse of evidence of prior conduct in State v. BRi/strom ,36
U.S. 436, 446 (1970) (reversing conviction for robbery of card game participant after de-
fendant had previously been acquitted of robbing another of the players in the same
game; determination that defendant was not one of the robbers was a necessary finding
made by the jury in the first prosecution).
While collateral estoppel initially appears to be a means of preventing the use of prior
acquittal evidence, one flaw in the argument exists. When a general verdict of not guilty
is given, it is nearly impossible to be certain which facts were necessary for the jury's
decision. Therefore, it cannot be determined which issues were actually litigated, and
such a determination is the key element of any collateral estoppel argument. Cf Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970) ("[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been deter-
mined by a valid and final judgement, that issue cannot again be litigated between the
same parties in any future lawsuit.").
31. In Wakefeld, the prior acquittal was the result of a charge of rape against defend-
ant perpetrated against a different victim at a different time. See 278 N.W.2d at 308.
Double jeopardy analysis was inapplicable because the second charge involved an entirely
different crime. Collateral estoppel also was inapplicable because the verdict in the prior
acquittal made it impossible to ascertain which factual determinations were necessary to
the result.
32. See, e.g., State v. Gress, 250 Minn. 337, 343, 84 N.W.2d 616, 621 (1957) (admissi-
ble evidence should not be prejudicial and remote); State v. Gavle, 234 Minn. 186, 208, 48
N.W.2d 44, 56 (1951) ("It is sometimes a close question whether the probative value of
such evidence is outweighed by the risk that its admission will necessitate undue consump-
tion of time, confuse the issues, surprise the defendant, or mislead and unduly prejudice
the jury. ... ); State v. Friend, 151 Minn. 138, 140, 186 N.W. 241, 242 (1922) (quoting
jurists critical of the practice of admitting evidence of prior criminal conduct); State v.
Nelson, 148 Minn. 285, 300, 181 N.W. 850, 856 (1921) (evidence of independent crimes
generally incompetent).
33. 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
34. Id. at 496-97, 139 N.W.2d at 173.
35. See id. at 493-94, 139 N.W.2d at 171. Professor Wigmore argues that unfair sur-
prise is one of the dangers of using evidence of prior conduct. See I J. WIGMORE, supra
note 1, § 194.
36. 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967).
[Vol, 6
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Billstrom established that evidence of prior conduct must be clear and
convincing,37 that when the prosecution gives the defendant Sprei'gi no-
tice of its intent to introduce evidence of prior conduct, the prosecution
must specify the exception to the exclusionary rule under which the evi-
dence is admissible,38 and that the court must admonish the jury that the
evidence was received for limited purposes, both when the evidence is
introduced and in the final charge.39 These procedures prevent the pros-
ecution from using evidence of the defendant's prior criminal conduct
that does not fall within an exception to the general exclusionary rule.40
The Spreigl and Billstrom rules have been codified in the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 1 Since prior acquittal evidence remains
admissible under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Minnesota Rules of Evidence,4 2 however, Wakeftld's implied amend-
ment of the procedural and evidentiary rules represents a further exten-
sion of the protection afforded criminal defendants by the Minnesota
court.
Recently, the Wakefld standard was reconsidered in State v. Burton.43
In Burton defendant was convicted of simple robbery and theft.44 At trial
evidence of an alleged prior offense of which defendant had been acquit-
37. According to the court: "The evidence of defendant's participation in other
crimes need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but must be clear and convincing."
Id. at 179, 149 N.W.2d at 285 (footnote omitted), quoted in State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102,
105 (Minn. 1979).
38. See State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967).
39. See id. at 179, 149 N.W.2d at 285. In State v. Forsman, 260 N.W.2d 160 (Minn.
1977), the jury admonition and the prosecution's explanation of which exclusionary ex-
ception makes the evidence admissible were held to be mandatory only if the defendant
requested them. See id. at 169.
40. The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized this consideration when adopting the
Spreigl-Billstrom procedure. See State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 130 (La. 1973).
41. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 7.02. The rule provides that the prosecution must give the
defendant notice of any intended use of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts unless: (1) the de-
fendant previously has been prosecuted for the offense; (2) the prior conduct is introduced
to rebut the defendant's good character; or (3) the conduct arises out of the same episode
or occurrence as the offense charged. See id. ,:
42. The use of prior acquittal evidence is not specifically excluded by the Minnesota
Rules of Evidence or the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. For example, if evi-
dence from a prior acquittal referred to a defendant's motive or opportunity, then, under
MINN. R. EVID. 404(b), that evidence may be admissible. See id. (evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts may be admissible for purposes other than character, such as motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, kr.owledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent). If the probative value of this evidence were found to substantially outweigh its
prejudicial impact, the evidence can be admitted under MINN. R. EvID. 403. Finally, if
the defendant had been previously prosecuted for the alleged act, he would not qualify for
Spreigl notice under MINN. R. CRIM. P. 7.02.
43. 281 N.W.2d 195 (Minn. 1979).
44. Id. at 196.
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ted was admitted. 45 The court reversed the conviction on the strength of
its Wakefield decision. 46 Although Burton appears to be in complete har-
mony with the holding in Wakefield, the last paragraph of Burton could
represent a slight retreat from the strict exclusionary standard. The
court concluded that "[b]ecause we hold that Olson's testimony cannot
be received, there is no occasion to rule on the contention that evidence
of prior criminal conduct may not be received until the trial court has
determined that the evidence of such conduct is clear and convincing."47
The court's statement could be viewed as recognizing a circumstance in
which the court would allow evidence from a prior acquittal, if the evi-
dence were clear and convincing. It is more likely, however, that the last
paragraph in Burton means that any potential application of the Billstrom
clear and convincing test in the Burton case was foreclosed by the Wake-
field decision. The forcefulness of the Wakefield opinion and the fact that
the Wakefield court found the Billstrom standard inadequate to protect
acquitted defendants support this conclusion.48
Because of its great probative value,49 the use of prior criminal con-
duct evidence necessarily has a place in our judicial system. Due to its
prejudicial tendencies, however, such evidence should be used cautiously.
Evidence from a defendant's prior acquittal is distinct from evidence re-
lating to an actual conviction.50 The use of such evidence has been prop-
erly abandoned because of the lesser probative value,51 the unfairness,
and the prejudice resulting from its admission. Undoubtedly, there will
be instances in which the Wakefield standard will exclude evidence that
would be crucial to the conviction of a criminal.52 Even in these in-
45. Id.
46. See id. at 197.
47. Id. at 198.
48. See 278 N.W.2d at 308. The Wakefied court stated: "Restricted categories and
procedural safeguards, however, do not eliminate prejudice to the defendant nor free him
from the necessity to defend against such evidence." Id.
49. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime,
78 HARV. L. REv. 426, 451 (1964); Comment, Exclusion of Prior Acquittals.- An Attack on the
"Prosecutor's Delight," 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 892, 897 (1974); Note, Use of Prior Crimes to Affect
Credibility and Penalty in Pennyslvania, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 382, 383-84 (1965).
51. See, e.g., State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 307, 350 P.2d 756, 764 (1960) (evidence of
prior criminal act offered to show plan, and that plan was probable part of act for which
defendant is presently being prosecuted; probative value of evidence weakened when jury
must make two inferences from the evidence).
52. An unfortunate example is People v. Oliphant, 399 Mich. 472, 250 N.W.2d 443
(1976). In Oiphant, the defendant had allegely raped three women prior to the trial for a
fourth rape. See id. at 482, 250 N.W.2d at 446. Of the three previous women, two had
brought charges against defendant and he was acquitted in both instances. See id. at 484-
86, 250 N.W.2d at 447-48. Defendant had developed a scheme for raping the women in
which it proved to be extremely difficult to show that the victims had not consented to the
[Vol. 6
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stances, the overall effect of Wakefield is beneficial. Allowing the state
repeatedly to introduce evidence that the defendant was found not guilty
in previous prosecutions contravenes basic notions of fairness. The Min-
nesota court has decided this result would be too high a price to pay for
the additional convictions that prior acquittal evidence might secure.
Family Law--CHILD STEALING-State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624
(Minn. 1978).
The growing rate of marriage dissolutions in the United States has
precipitated a deluge of family-related litigation in the courts.' Among
the most ardently contested issues in dissolution actions is the right to
custody of children. 2 Although the overriding consideration is the best
interests of the child, courts must also decide the individual rights of both
parents. 3 An unfortunate consequence of many custody decrees is the
intercourse. See id. at 488, 250 N.W.2d at 449. When the identical method used by de-
fendant was described by all four victims, however, it became readily apparent that de-
fendant was guilty. See id. The Wakefield standard applied to this case would have
resulted in a remand since prior acquittal evidence had been introduced. Compare State v.
Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d at 309 (prior acquittal evidence inadmissible) with People v. Oli-
phant, 399 Mich. 472, 498-500, 250 N.W.2d 443, 454 (1976) (prior acquittal evidence
admissible absent collateral estoppel or double jeopardy). While the testimony of the wo-
man who had not pressed charges against defendant may have been used in the second
trial, it is possible that a dangerous rapist would have been acquitted for a third time.
1. The marriage dissolution rate has increased drastically in the last decade. An
estimated 1,122,000 divorces were granted in 1978, nearly double the number in 1968. See
27 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS
REPORT No. 12, at 2 (1979). In Minnesota, there was almost one marriage dissolution for
every two marriages in 1978, with over fourteen thousand divorces being granted. See id.
at 5, 7.
2. See Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child CustodyJurdiction Act and Remain-
ing Problems. Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modiftiations, 65 CALIF. L. REV.
978, 979 (1979); Hudak, Seize, Run and Sue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child Custody Litaton
in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. REV. 521, 521 (1974); Comment, Best Interests of the Child-
Maryland Child Custody Disputes, 37 MD. L. REV. 641, 641 (1978). It is estimated that each
year some 900,000 children are affected by the divorce of their parents and become a
potential issue in the dissolution litigation. See 123 CONG. REC. S2982 (daily ed. Feb. 24,
1977) (remarks of Sen. McGovern).
3. See Fisher v. Devins, 294 Minn. 496, 498, 200 N.W.2d 28, 30 (1972) (duty of the
court is to determine best interest and welfare of child); Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn. 261,
265, 187 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1971) (overriding consideration is child's welfare). Seegeneral'y
Comment, Protecting the Interests of Children in Custody Proceedings. A Perspective on Twenty Years
of Theory and Practice in the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 234
(1978); Comment, Child Custody. Best Interests of Children vs. Constitutional Rights of Parents, 81
DICK. L. REV. 733 (1976-1977).
The parental rights doctrine, requiring that a parent be awarded custody unless
proven unfit, is based on the assumption that the interests of the child are best served by
preserving the parents' right to custody. See McCough & Shindell, Coming of Age." The Best
Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 212
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